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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant seeks to overturn the Lower Court's
decision and have judgment entered in her favor.
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
After a trial on the merits the Court granted
reformation of the contract between Appellant and Appellees
and denied relief to Appellant.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to have the Lower Court's decision
vacated, a decision entered in her favpr and a remand to the
Lower Court on the issue of damages.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 10, 1968, Appellees sold to Appellant
under a Uniform Real Estate Contract certain real property
in Duchesne County, Utah.

Title to the property passed to

Appellant by Warranty Deed dated October 30, 1969, and the
deed was placed in escrow until the sum specified in the contract should have been paid to Appellees.

On or about Feb-

ruary 26, 19 73, Appellant paid to Appellees the entire amount
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due on the contract and the Warranty Deed was delivered
and placed of record.
On July 10, 19 70, after the Warranty Deed was in
escrow and before Appellant placed the Warranty Deed as of
record, Appellees sold to Howell Spear the mineral rights of
said property which Appellees allege to have owned.

The

Warranty Deed between Appellant and Appellees on its face was
an unrestricted sale, no mention of any exceptions as to the
mineral rights appearing in the document.
THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
TO JUSTIFY REFORMING THE CONTRACT
OF SALE USED IN THIS CASE.
Two clauses of the Uniform Real Estate Contract
are here in issue.
"Clause 19. The Seller on receiving
the payments herein reserved to be paid at
the time and in the manner above mentioned
agrees to execute and deliver to Buyer or
assigns, a good and sufficient warranty deed
conveying the title to the above described
premises free and clear of all encumbrances
except as herein mentioned..."
"Clause 20. It is hereby expressly
understood and agreed by the parties hereto
that the Buyer accepts the said property in
its present condition and that there are no
representations, covenants, or agreements
between the parties hereto with reference
to said property except as herein specifically set forth or attached hereto."
(Emphasis added.)
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It will be readily seen from an examination of
the sales contract that no addition or exception was taken
to the Warranty Deed except notification that a mobile home
located on the property would be included in the purchase
price.
No issue of ambiguity with respect to these clauses
appears in Appellees1 pleadings and the issue of ambiguity was
not raised at trial.

In fact, Appellees1 Answer would seem

to concede that on its face the contract is clear as to its
meaning and import.

Consequently, the only issue involved in

this case is the reformability of this contract.
Long ago the Supreme Court of the United States
indicated what the rule of law was with respect to reformation of land contracts:
"The jurisdiction of equity to reform
written instruments, where there is a mutual
mistake, or mistake on one side and fraud or
inequitable conduct on the other, is undoubted;
but to justify such reformation the evidence
must be sufficiently cogent to thoroughly
satisfy the mind of the court. (Cites omitted,
Simons Creek Coal Co. v. Doran, 142 U.S. 417,
435, 12 S. Ct. 239, 245, 35 L. Ed. 1063, 1892)"
No allegation of fraud or inequitable conduct
has been raised by Appellees in pleadings or at trial except
in so far as Appellant seeks to enforce this contract as clearly
written.

Furthermore, the record shows that no evidence of any
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kind was produced to indicate that Appellant knew anything
she should have revealed, and did not reveal, or that she
hid anything from Appellees, or that she tricked, fooled,
lied, cajoled or intimidated Appellees or that Appellant
affirmatively acted in any way with conscious intent to deny
any right to Appellees.

The record further shows that both

parties at all times negotiated at arms length and had ample
opportunity to correct any errors contained in the agreement
or object to the absence of any clause that ought to have
been in the document.
In light of this record Appellees 1 contention must
be that there was a mutual mistake.

The term mutual mistake

has been defined in 66 AmJur 2d 549, Reformation of Instruments,
Section 22. At page 550 that section reads:
"Indeed, when no question of fraud,
bad faith, or inequitable conduct is involved
and the right to reform an instrument is based
solely on a mistake, it is necessary that the
mistake be mutual, and that both parties understood the contract as the complaint or petition
alleges it ought to have been, and as in fact
it was except for the mistake, and this is so
whether the mistake is one of fact or one of
law.
It follows from the above that in the
absence of fraud or inequitable conduct by the
other party, or of a voluntary instrument which
a donor seeks to have reformed, unilateral mistake is not a ground for reformation. . .fl
(Emphasis added.)
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AmJur 2d lists a great number of cases, from
a large number of jurisdictions, substantiating the requirement that the mistake be mutual in the absence of
fraud or inequitable conduct which have not been alleged
or proved in the case at bar.
Section 123 of the same topic in AmJur 2d states
the law to be that a mere preponderance of the evidence is
not sufficient to prove a mutual mistake and again cites
numerous authorities at p. 647 to support that proposition.
At page 648, AmJur 2d lists the various jurisdictions and
their requirements that the evidence be clear, unequivocal,
decisive, strong, cogent, precise, exact or convincing, and
lists a great many authorities for each at page 64 8. AmJur
2d further points out at page 651: "an honest difference of
understanding as to what the contract was is fatal to reformation, for in such case there is no meeting of the minds
of the parties and no pre-existing agreement to which the
written instrument can be conformed."
supporting authorities.

Again, AmJur lists

Finally, AmJur 2d points out that

"it has been doubted whether, as a general rule, a writing
should be reformed on the unsupported testimony of the party
asking its reformation." P. 6 51.
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It is clear then that the general trend discovered
by AmJur is that:
1.

In the absence of fraud or inequitable
conduct, neither of which have been urged
here, there must be a mutual mistake by
both parties.

2.

If there is a mistake by only one party,
then the motion for reformation must be
denied.

3.

That the evidence to support the reformation must be such that it establishes the
mistake by more than a preponderance of
the evidence.

4.

That an honest difference of opinion as to
the terms of the contract is not enough to
support reformation.

5.

That the unsupported testimony of an interested party seeking reformation should not
warrant the reformation of a document.

Utah case law is not apposite to these rules and,
in fact, supports them.

Naisbitt v. Hodges, 6 Ut. 2d 116,

307 P. 2d 620, (1957); Bench v. Pace, Utah, 538, P. 2d 180
(1975); Ellison v. Johnson, 18 Ut. 2d 374, 423 P. 2d 657 (1967);
Intermountain Farmers Ass'n. v. Peart, 30 Ut. 2d 201, 515 P. 2d
614 (1973).
In Bench v. Pace, supra, the Court quoted from
Williston on Contracts, Vol 13, 3d Ed. Sec. 1552 favorably.
"It is understood that to warrant
reformation or recision, the court must be
persuaded by the clearest kind of evidence
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that a mistake has been made by both
parties, or in some cases by one, or that
some other basis exists upon which relief
should be granted." (538 P. 2d at 182,
emphasis added,)
Williston clarifies when a reformation may occur
if a mistake occurs as to one party only and essentially
relates the same case law discussed in AmJur 2d, to-wit: in
the absence of fraud, etc., there must be a mutual mistake
by both parties.

As Bench, supra, indicates,the mistake of

both parties must be proved by "the clearest kind of evidence".
In Naisbitt v. Hodges, supra, the Utah Supreme Court had occasion to expand and more clearly define its requirement of
evidence to support a motion for reformation.
"All that is required is that
evidence exists whereby this court can
say that the trial judge acted as a
reasonable man in finding that the
proof of the fact asserted is greater
than a mere preponderance." (6 Ut. 2d
at 12 2, emphasis added.)
In determining what a preponderance of the evidence
is, Black 1 s Law Dictionary provides useful case law and reasoning.
"Preponderance. Greater weight
of evidence, or evidence which is more
credible and convincing to the mind.
Button v. Metcalf, 80 Wis. 193, 49 N.W.
809. That which best accords with reason
and probability. U.S. v. McCaskill, D.C.

-8-

Fla., 200 F. 332. The word "preponderance" means something more than "weight";
it denotes a superiority of weight, or outweighing. The words are not synonymous,
but substantially different. There is
generally a "weight" of evidence on each
side in case of contested facts. But
juries cannot properly act upon the weight
of evidence, in favor of the one having
the onus, unless it overbear, in some degree,
the weight upon the other side. Mathes v.
Aggler & Musser Seed Co., 178 P. 713, 715,
179 Cal. 697; Barnes v. Phillips, 184 Ind.
415, 111 N.E. 419. See, also, Weight of
Evidence.
It rests with that evidence which,
when fairly considered, produces the stronger
impression, and has the greater weight, and
is more convincing as to its truth when weighed
against the evidence in opposition thereto.
S. Yamamoto v. Puget Sound Lumber Co., 84 Wash.
411, 146 P. 861, 863; but it does not mean
greater number of witnesses. Heerdink v.
Kohmescher, 94 Ind. App. 296, 180 N.E. 683,
684.
Preponderance of evidence may not be
determined by the number of witnesses, but
by the greater weight of all evidence, which
does not necessarily mean the greater number
of witnesses, but opportunity for knowledge,
information possessed, and manner of testifying determines the weight of testimony.
Carver v. Garver, 52 Colo. 227, 121 P. 165,
166, Ann. Cas. 1913 D, 674.
It should be remembered that the quotation defines
preponderance and that Utah law and the general trend of the
country's case law require more than a preponderance.

As AmJur

points out, the evidence need not lead to a conviction of "beyond a reasonable doubt," but it must be more than a preponderance, i.e., clear and convincing.
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Those cases in which the Court has previously
granted a reformation will be useful in that they indicate
the quantum of evidence necessary.

In Bench, supra, the

defendants claimed that they had retained the oil and mineral rights and asked the Court to reform the contract of
sale between themselves and plaintiff to show the reservation of oil and mineral rights.
motion.

The Court granted the

At trial the evidence was conflicting as between

the parties.

But in addition to his own testimony, defen-

dant (1) had an independent witness who testified and verified defendant's position; (2) three years after the contract,^ 1968 and in 1969, plaintiffs approached defendants
to buy oil and mineral rights on the property which they
wouldn't have done had they owned the rights; (3) the defendant had leased the mineral estate to third parties, which
fact was well knovm to the plaintiffs, and the leasing arrangement was ratified by the plaintiff without objection; and (4)
the defendant's ownership of the mineral estate was not
threatened until the proceedings were initiated.
In Intermountain Farmers Association, supra, the
reformation was granted.

Testimony of the parties conflicted.

The plaintiff alleged that of the five acres of ground he owned
he intended to only convey two acres to defendant but a mistake
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by the scrivener gave defendant the entire five acres*

In

addition to plaintiff's testimony, the Court found (1) that
there was an outstanding real estate contract for three
acres of the land with a third party at the time plaintiff
sold the two adjoining acres to defendant; (2) that the
third party was in possession of the three acres at the
time of the sale; (3) that defendants, prior to the consummation of the sale, had inspected the property at least three
times; and (4) that plaintiff asked defendants to reconvey
the property when he discovered the mistake*
In Naisbitt v. Hodges, supra, the Court found that
defendant failed to object to numerous activities adverse to
his claims of which he had knowledge.

Independent witnesses

verified that defendant believed he owned nothing and the
Court refused to reform the contract. '
Finally, in Ellison v. Johnson, supra, the Court
refused to grant reformation.

The significant finding of the

Court was "Plaintiffs deny any mistake and the agreement is unambiguous." (18 Ut. 2d at 376)

Defendant did no more than al-

lege the mistake without any further evidence.

Furthermore,

the Court found that defendant received everything he had
bargained for.
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Th ese cases, therefore, substantiate the rule
that in order to reform a contract the evidence must be
more than a preponderance.

Simple allegation by one side

and subsequent denial by the other is insufficient grounds
without more concrete evidence.

The unsupported, self-

serving comment of an interested party cannot be sufficient
basis for reformation, as Ellison, supra, shows, in the
face of a clear unambiguous agreement.
Applying the foregoing rules of law to the case
at bar we arrive at the following:
1.

The testimony of Appellees and Appellant
is in conflict. Appellees testified that
they told Appellant that she would receive
no mineral rights. (Trial Transcript, pp.
62, 63, 66, 67, 74) To the contrary,
Appellant testified that Appellees said
nothing about the minerals at first but
that later, when attempting to clear a
cloud on the title to the property, Appellant testified that Appellees brought
a copy of an escrow agreement which spoke
about mineral rights. At that point Appellant testified that Appellee indicated
he had no interest in the minerals.
(Trial Transcript, pp. 11, 12.)

2.

Appellees had no corrobating witnesses or
evidence. On the other hand, in addition
to Appellant's testimony, Appellant produced an escrow document which established
that mineral rights existed when the contract was consummated. (Exhibit P-l).

3.

Appellees denied having knowledge as to
whether or not mineral rights existed on
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the property. (T.T., p. 62) Appellant
rebutted that testimony with the December,
1951 escrow agreement which showed that
Appellees had knowledge of the existing
rights from as early as December, 1951.
4.

Appellant testified that Appellees gave
her a copy of the escrow agreement (T.T.,
p. 11). Appellees denied having done so.
(T.T. , pp. 66, 67).

5.

Appellee testified that he signed over his
share, though he is not clear as to just
what he signed over, to his brother. (T.T.,
p. 67). Appellant's expert witness, Mr.
Garner, testified that the only documents
recorded (see Exhibit P-8) were the original
grant of title to the Ostlers, the transfer
from the Ostlers to the Forrers, the transfer of mineral rights from Mr. and Mrs.
Forrer to Mr. Spear, and the transfer from
Mr. and Mrs. Forrer to Mrs. Ingram of title
to the land.

The most that can be said for this evidence is that
it is in conflict. Neither party seems to be able to clearly
indicate what the actual oral contract was though Appellant
submits that a fair evaluation of the evidence would indicate
that Mrs. Ingram has the more substantiated testimony.
It is submitted that at all times Mrs. Ingram acted
in accordance with her interpretation of the contract.

She

testified that she sought help from others to investigate her
mineral property as early as 1973 when the property was finally
paid off.

(T.T. at p. 18)

Furthermore, when asked why she had

not investigated earlier, she testified that the property was
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involved in a separate lav/suit and she was not sure what
the status was.

(T.T. at p. 22)

The property had been fore-

closed on by Mr. and Mrs. Porrer resulting in Ingram paying
off Forrers and obtaining her deed.
The December, 1951 escrow agreement is clear on
its face.

Mr. Forrer signed the document and so testified.

(T.T., p. 67)

That testimony is not ambiguous. On the other

hand he testified that he signed the document in 1964 in order
to transfer the title to his brother so that his brother could
get on welfare.
(Ibid.)

But he testified that his brother died in 19 63!

Perhaps at Mr. Forrer1s age one can be allowed the mis-

take of reversing these years, nevertheless, the escrow agreement bears the date of December 10, 1951 and the agreement indicates in its first sentence that the sale was to both brothers
The notary public indicates that both brothers signed on that
date.

The document reserves 1/4 of the mineral rights to the

Forrer brothers, consequently, Mr. Forrer was aware of the
mineral rights reserved to him since at least 1951. Obviously,
this testimony leaves something to be desired in terms of claril
Furthermore, at p. 66 of the Trial Transcript, Mr.
Forrer testified as follows:
"And I figured if there was any mineral
right it should be stated on the deed, the
same as the water shares should be stated on
the deed."
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On the other hand at p. 29, Mrs* Ingram testified:
"Q.

A.

Mrs. Ingram, with respect to the one-fourth
mineral interest that you testified that you
knew or thought that you were getting when
you purchased this property, is there any
reason why you didn't make reference to that
on the documents that it was a one-fourth
interest that you were getting?
No, because at that time I also had another
deed. It just wasn't, I don't believe, customary to put them on deeds, and I was just unaware that it was put on like that. I knew
that if you wished to keep something off that
you put it on, you know. If we would have
wished to put it on there, it would have been
on there. I'm not sure."

Obviously, both parties had honest differences of
opinion as to what belonged on the contract which only serves
to emphasize the conflicts in the testimony.

At the very most,

all the evidence, as a whole, serves to indicate that there may
have been an honest difference of opinion as to the terms of
the contract and such a circumstance does not warrant a reformation.
In summary, Appellant contends that Appellee has not
come forward with that "clearest kind of evidence" required by
Utah case law and therefore this Court should vacate the Lower
Court's judgment and enter a verdict in favor of Mrs. Ingram
and remand the case to the Lower Court on the issue of damages.
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APPELLES WAS NEGLIGENT IN HIS ACTIONS
AND SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED REFORMATION
ON THAT BASIS ALONE.
In Ellison v. Johnson, supra, the pertinent rule
was stated:
"Evidence to sustain a mutual mistake of
fact must be clear, definite and convincing,
and the party asserting it should not be
guilty of negligence in the execution of the
contract."(18 Ut. 2d at 377)
In Ellison, supra,
the contract reformed.

the defendant was seeking to have

He testified that he relied on plaintiff

in the computation of complex figures.
referred to as "carelessness."

Such reliance the Court

(18 Ut. 2d at 377)

case at bar the same facts exist.

In the

Appellee relied on Appellant

(T.T. at 71) and never examined the document for its legal significance even though he knew that the oil and mineral rights
were not mentioned.

Furthermore, he testified that he relied on

his own understanding of the legal significance of the document,
(T.T. at p. 66) rather than have an attorney render a legal opir
ion.

Appellant submits that this carelessness falls within the

rule of Ellison, supra, and for that reason the Lower Court's
decision should be vacated and judgment entered for Appellant.
CONCLUSION
Pursuant to 57-1-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which
demands that any exceptions to a Warranty Deed appear in the
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document of transfer of title and because m s u m c i e n c
evidence exists to warrant a reformation of the land contract involved in this case and because Appellees were careless in their execution of the land contract and title deed,
Appellant submits that the Lower Court's decision should be
vacated, judgment in this Court entered for Appellant and
the case remanded to the Lower Court on the issue of damages.

Respectfully submitted,
HATCH, McRAE & RICHARDSON

Robert M. McRae
Attorney for PlaintiffAppellant
370 East Fifth South Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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